Is government ideology important for fiscal policy? I study this question with data from all German States over the period . To identify the effect of ideology, I rely on a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. I find that left-wing state governments spend more than state governments with right-wing and mixed ideology.
Introduction
Opinions differ on whether party ideology matters for fiscal policy. Some authors argue that parties converge to the position of the median voter (Downs, 1957; Wittman, 1983) .
According to this strand of the literature, observed differences in policies when different parties are in power should be attributed to unobserved differences in voter preferences.
In contrast, the second strand of the literature argues that parties and their ideology are crucial for fiscal outcomes. Politicians are assumed to hold firm ideological convictions which, once elected, they implement into policy (Hibbs, 1977; Besley and Coate, 1997) .
Which of these theories describes policy making in modern democracies? Does ideology matter for fiscal policy? Or are voter preferences the key to understanding differences in policy outcomes between governments with distinct ideologies?
The main difficulty in answering these questions is to separate the effect of government ideology from that of voter preferences and other unobserved variables. Since ideology is not allocated randomly to political jurisdictions, (unobserved) confounding variables might determine both government ideology and fiscal policy. Given that it is not feasible to conduct randomized experiments, quasi-experimental methods have to be used to identify the fiscal effects of ideology. A particularly credible quasi-experimental method that is increasingly applied to study the consequences of ideology is the regression discontinuity design. The regression discontinuity design uses the fact that a particular political bloc (consisting of left-or right-wing parties) can typically form the government once it receives 50% of the seats in parliament. There is hence a discontinuity in government ideology at the 50% seat share threshold. Political jurisdictions where e. g. the left-wing party bloc has a seat share just below the 50% threshold should exhibit similar characteristics as jurisdictions where the left-wing party bloc has just above 50% of the seats, but government ideology in the two jurisdictions differs distinctively. The allocation of government ideology to political jurisdictions in the neighborhood of the threshold can therefore be perceived as random and any observed differences in policy outcomes can be ascribed to ideology.
The evidence from different regression discontinuity studies on the effects of ideology is so far ambiguous. Lee et al. (2004) find that party ideology matters for how members of the US House of Representatives vote. Similarly, Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) concludes that ideology affects fiscal and macroeconomic outcomes in Swedish municipalities. On the other hand, Ferreira and Gyorko (2009) and Gerber and Hopkins (2011) find that ideology has a negligible effect on policies in US cities. Furdas and Kis-Katos (2010) reach the same conclusion for German cities.
That no effects of ideology are found at the municipal level in the US and Germany is not surprising. Ferreira and Gyorko (2009) note that, for example, Tiebout competition may limit partisan politics at the local level in the US. Similarly, there is a lot of anecdotal evidence indicating that municipal councils in Germany focus on practical day-to-day issues rather than ideological battles. But in contrast to Sweden, Germany and the US possess a tier of government between the municipal and the federal level: the states. Ideology may be more important at this level of government in these two countries.
This paper contributes to the literature by studying with a regression discontinuity design the fiscal effects of government ideology at a subordinate yet powerful level of government.
More specifically, I study whether government ideology affects state expenditures and state deficits 1 using a dataset that covers all 16 German states over the period 1975-2005. 2 In contrast to municipalities which typically have little political or fiscal power vis-a-vis higher tiers of government, the German States have significant political and fiscal autonomy.
Moreover, almost all states have witnessed both left-wing and right-wing governments during their histories, thereby providing a rich source of between and within-variation in government ideology even at such a high tier of government. The German States are therefore a compelling institutional laboratory to study the causal effects of ideology on fiscal policy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief description of the political and fiscal system of Germany. 3 presents a graphical analysis of the relationship between ideology and fiscal policy and discusses for Germany the validity of the assumption that underly the regression discontinuity design. Section 4. introduces the empirical approach. The results are collected in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1 Given the system of fiscal federalism in Germany, these two fiscal variables are the ones under effective control of state governments. Revenues, on the other hand, are essentially exogenous. See below for a more comprehensive discussion.
2 Applications of regression discontinuity designs at levels of government above municipalities are rare.
One example is Leigh (2007) who studies US States and uses a regression discontinuity design in some specifications. There is of course a large number of studies investigating the effect of ideology on fiscal and economic policy using different estimation frameworks, notably Besley and Case (2003) and Reed (2006) for US States and Seitz (2000) , Galli and Rossi (2002) , Tepe and Vanhuysse (2008) , Schneider (2010) , and Potrafke (2012) for German States. Imbeau et al. (2001) offer a meta-analysis of studies for OECD countries. The role of ideology for budgetary reforms in Europe is studied by Fabrizio and Mody (2010) .
Ideological differences in macroeconomic policies is studied by Alesina et al. (1997) and Scruggs (2001) .
The political and fiscal system of Germany
Germany is a peculiar federation. On the one hand, the German States are highly autonomous. They may act in many policy areas independently from the federal government. Yet subnational autonomy does not result in large institutional differences between states. This can be explained to some extent by a stipulation in the federal constitution that demands institutional homogeneity within the federation. 4 Bavaria had a second chamber, the Senate, until 1999. However, the Senate had no meaningful political role and was abolished by a popular referendum.
5 The following exposition draws on Freitag and Vatter (2008 While the CDU is unambiguously right-and the SPD, Green Party, and PDS are unambiguously left-wing, it is not somewhat difficult to classify the FDP because it was sometimes involved in coalitions with the SPD (especially before 1982). I nevertheless classify the FDP as a right-wing party because that it its defining feature is its pro-market stance: the FDP has always been to the right of the political spectrum with respect to economic policy.
7 The SPD is much older and has a history that reaches back more than a hundred years.
While the political system is similar throughout the federation, there is a lot of ideological variation both within and between states. (1992) (1993) (1994) and the SPD-FDP coalition in Berlin (1975 Berlin ( -1980 , Hesse (1975 Hesse ( -1982 , Lower-Saxony (1975 ), North Rhine-Westphalia (1975 -1979 ) RhinelandPalatinate (1991 and Hamburg (1975 Hamburg ( -1977 Hamburg ( , 1988 Hamburg ( -1990 are treated as governments with mixed ideology. Figure 1 also shows that all states except Bavaria have witnessed changes in government ideology during the sample period. Table 1 shows the total number of government changes during the sample period in all 16 West-German States and also the specific transitions. There were altogether 49 government changes.
In addition to having an understanding of the political system, it is also important to be familiar with Germany's variant of fiscal federalism to understand state level fiscal 8 The name of this type of coalition is derived from the party colors of the parties involved. They resemble the traffic lights in Germany (SPD is red, the Green Party is green, and the FDP is yellow).
policies. The fiscal constitution of Germany gives the states significant expenditure but only minuscule tax autonomy. For all intents and purposes, the states can determine their expenditure policy without federal oversight. While all states have had balanced budget rules during the sample period, these were weak and effectively not binding.
States receive most of their revenues through shared taxes and transfers. The revenues from the most important taxes -in particular the income, value added, and corporate tax -that is collected within the territory of a state is shared with the federal government (and to a smaller extent with the municipalities). States cannot set rates or define bases for these taxes, both rates and bases are the same throughout the federation. There are also no differences in rates for most state taxes either i. e. taxes whose revenues accrues completely to the states.
There are, however, differences in the value of the existing tax bases and hence in tax revenues collected by states. To account for any differences in fiscal capacities, several transfer mechanisms have been instituted. First, a certain fraction of total value added tax revenues is siphoned off from the standard tax distribution system and given to states with below average tax revenues. In a second step, states with above fiscal capacity pay transfers to states with below fiscal capacities. Since the federal government is not involved at this stage of the equalization scheme, it is referred to as horizontal equalization (Länderfinanzausgleich im engeren Sinn). Finally, the federal government pays various vertical transfers to states with below average tax revenues (Bundesergänzungszuweisungen).
Both horizontal and vertical transfers have the effect that available total revenues of states are typically much closer to each other than initial tax revenues: there is a marked equalization of fiscal capacities.
The system of fiscal federalism in Germany implies that state governments can autonomously decide over expenditures and deficits but not over revenues. That revenues are essentially exogenous from the perspective of state governments is the reason why I focus in the following only on state expenditures and state deficits.
3 Graphical analysis
Discontinuities in outcome variables
As a precursor to the regression discontinuity regressions, this section presents a graphical or of mixed ideology. These two types of governments comprise the control group in the graphs.
To the left and right of the threshold, I provide local polynomial plots with different bandwidths (1, 2, and 3). If left-wing ideology has a causal effect of fiscal policy, the plots should display a discontinuous jump at the threshold. 10 As indicated in Figure 5 , there is a marked jump at the threshold in expenditures and deficits for all bandwidths, indicating that left-wing governments spend more and have larger deficits than the control group (governments with right-wing and mixed ideology).
Are the discontinuities in the plots in reality non-linearities? Some non-linearities indeed seem to be present of expenditures in the neighborhood of the threshold if the bandwidth is 1, but with slightly larger bandwidths the plot is smooth. Also, the discontinuity at the threshold does not seem to be driven by non-linearities even if a bandwidth of 1 is chosen because the slope of the plot has the same sign (i. e. it is negative) both to the left and to the right of the threshold. For deficits, there are no significant non-linearities in the neighborhood of the thresholds for all bandwidths. Only at seat shares relatively far away from the threshold (above +5) non-linearities emerge, and only for a bandwidth of 1.
Figure 6 plots real expenditures per capita and real deficits per capita against the rightwing seat share. There is a discontinuity at 0 in the probability that right-wing parties form the government (i. e. the discontinuity is again fuzzy instead of sharp). Below the threshold, governments either have a left-wing or a mixed ideology. Above the threshold, the probability of right-wing government increases discontinuously.
As indicated by the local polynomial plots, there are discontinuous drop in both expenditures and deficits once the right-wing seat share crosses the threshold for all bandwidths.
The plots indicate that right-wing governments appear to spend less and have smaller deficits than the control group (left-wing governments and governments with mixed ideology). All except the plot with a bandwidth of 1 are smooth and do not indicate significant non-linearities.
In summary, Figures 5 and 6 indicate that ideology has a significant effect on fiscal policy in the German States: left-wing governments spend more and have higher deficits than the control group whereas right-wing governments spend less and have lower deficits.
Validity of the regression discontinuity design assumptions
The validity of the regression discontinuity design relies on several assumptions. An important one is that agents do not have the ability to precisely manipulate the forcing variable.
This assumption is most likely fulfilled in the current context. Parties have no ability to manipulate electoral outcomes given the strong democratic institutions in Germany.
Coordination of voters is also impractical at the level of state elections.
One possibility to formally test the no-manipulation assumption formally is the McCracy test. The test relies on the idea that if there is precise manipulation, the assignment variable should exhibit discontinuities at the threshold. For example, the empirical density of left-wing seat shares just below 50% should be much smaller than the density of left-wing seat shares above 50% if there is manipulation in favor of left-wing parties. An alternative method to check for manipulation is to realize that if there is any manipulation at all, it is most likely to originate from the incumbent government. For example, a left-wing incumbent government might be capable to precisely manipulate close elections such that the left-wing seat share is just above 50% while the opposition cannot do so (Grimmer et al., 2011) . Panel Another critical assumption of the regression discontinuity design is that there are no discontinuities in pre-treatment variables at the threshold. If there are such discontinuities, the identification strategy could be questioned. Any effect associated with ideology could also be explained by the discontinuities in the pre-treatment variables.
The standard approach to establish whether this assumption holds is to plot pre-treatment control variables against the forcing variable. Figure 7 plots four pre-treatment control variables against the left-wing seat share. The four control variables are real state GDP per capita, state unemployment rate, the share of inhabitants over 65, and the share of inhabitants below 15. 11 Each data point in the four subfigures refers to the average value of the respective control variable in the previous legislative period. 12 As indicated in the figure, there are no significant discontinuities at the thresholds. The plots to the left and to the 11 The definition and source of all variables can be found in 12 More specifically, assume that the election takes place in year t and that the next legislative period rums from t to t+5. Assume furthermore that the previous legislative period ran from t-5 to t-1. Then the pre-treatment value of GDP per capita for the period t to t+5 is the average during the period t-5 to t-1.
right merge almost seamlessly. Figure 8 reports the corresponding plots for the right-wing seat share. As in the plots in Figure 7 , no discontinuities are visible. In summary, therefore, these plots suggest that the discontinuities that were observed in Figure 5 and 6 are due to ideology and not due to other underlying pre-treatment variables.
Empirical model
The figures reported in the previous section give a first impression regarding the fiscal effects of ideology. In this section, I study the effect econometrically by estimating local linear regressions with bandwidths of different sizes. The basic model for left-wing governments is:
The corresponding model for right-wing governments is:
y =β 1 Right i,t + β 2 Right seat share i,t + β 3 Right it × Right seat share i,t
In these models y is either real state expenditures per capita or real state deficits per there is a right-wing majority. Consequently, I use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design.
I instrument the Lef t dummy with a dummy variable that is 1 if the left-wing seat share is above 50% and 0 else. Similarly, I instrument the Right dummy with a dummy variable that is 1 when the right-wing seat share is above 50% and 0 else.
13
While pre-treatment control variables are in principle not necessary in regression discontinuity designs, they can reduce the variance of the estimates and guard against bias in small samples (Hoxby, 2000) . Therefore, I include in all regressions state (α i ) and year (γ t ) fixed effects. Finally, ǫ it is the error term. For hypothesis tests, I always use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and cluster at the level of the current legislative period. That 13 Thus, I run two stage least squares on subsamples covering observations within specific bandwidths around the threshold. This approach is equivalent to local linear regressions with a rectangular kernel.
is, all observations on expenditures and deficits in a given legislative period are perceived as part of the same cluster. The results for real deficits per capita, on the other hand, are at first sight not in line with the graphical evidence presented in Section 3.1. The estimated coefficient is insignificant for all bandwidths. While left-wing governments spend more than right-wing governments, they do not appear to incur larger deficits. This must imply that they have higher revenues. This is an notable finding because, as indicated above, state governments have almost no tax autonomy in Germany. An possible explanation for this result might be that left-wing governments have received higher transfers during the sample period. I explore whether this possibility drives the results in a robustness check in the next section. Table 3 presents the results for right-wing governments. Note that the Model IV in this table (using a bandwidth of 3) is estimated with OLS rather than TSLS because the relationship between the seat share of right-wing parties and government ideology is deterministic for this range of the assignment variable. That is, when the right-wing seat share is between 50% to 53%, the government is always right-wing. Thus, the regression discontinuity design design is sharp rather than fuzzy for a bandwidth of 3. For the remaining bandwidths, the design remains fuzzy.
Results

Baseline results
The results are largely consistent with the graphical analysis. Once the bandwidth is sufficiently narrow, the results indicate that right-wing governments spend less and have smaller deficits than the control group. Estimates using a bandwidth of three percentage points indicate an effect of around 277 Euros on expenditures and 372 Euros on deficits.
Estimates with larger bandwidths suggest a significantly negative effect as well, even though the size is smaller.
Robustness tests
I conduct a number of robustness tests. First, I check whether a linear control function for the left-wing and right-wing seat share, respectively, is too inflexible. There might exist significant non-linearities even for relatively small bandwidths around the threshold. Thus, I re-estimate the baseline models for left-wing and right-wing governments after including a quadratic polynomial. The federal government (and other states) might be prepared to support higher transfers to states with the same ideology. Alternatively, the federal government might feel less compelled to grant transfers to states with the same ideology because it might take their political support as granted.
The results of the robustness tests for left-wing governments are collected in Table 4 . I report for brevity only the estimates for the discontinuity dummy. The results are generally in line with the baseline estimates and suggest that left-wing governments spend more than the control group. The effect is consistently positive and significant once the bandwidth is sufficiently small. The effect is always positive and numerically large when pre-treatment control variables are included. This suggests that the use of control variables can mitigate the bias associated with a large bandwidth. An equally interesting finding is that explicitly controlling for transfer receipts does not affect the estimates in a significant way. Hence, the baseline findings were not driven by interactions between ideology and transfer receipts.
For deficits, the results are also in line with the baseline findings: the estimate is typically insignificant. For a bandwidth of 3, it is sometimes significantly negative. However, these estimates should be discounted as the coefficient changes signs between models and appears to be unstable. Table 5 reports the results for right-wing governments. The results are again largely in line with the baseline findings. For expenditures, the estimates are generally negative and significant. The size of the estimates vary somewhat, but are on average around 200 to 400 Euros. However, some models suggest an even larger effect. For deficits, the estimates suggest a negative and significant effect for almost all robustness checks and bandwidths.
The numerical value is on average around 200 to 300 Euros, even though some estimates are larger. Overall, these findings indicate that right-wing governments spend less and have lower deficits than the control group.
Conclusion
I study the effect of ideology on fiscal policy. To identify the effect of ideology, I use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. The estimates suggest that left-wing governments spend more than their control group. With respect to deficits, however, there are no significant differences between left-wing governments and the control group. For rightwing governments, the estimates suggest that they spend less and have lower deficits than their control group.
The results indicate that ideology has an effect on the fiscal policy of German States.
The findings are consistent with the notion that left-wing governments prefer higher spending than right-wing governments. With respect to deficits, the results are more ambiguous.
Left-wing governments did not have significantly different deficits than their control group.
Yet right-wing governments had lower deficits than their control group. This finding implicitly indicates that left-wing governments have larger deficits than right-wing governments but smaller deficits than governments of mixed ideology.
That ideology is important for fiscal outcomes is on the one hand reassuring. It indicates that by choosing different political parties, voters have the ability to change the fiscal trajectory of their state. On the other hand, it is also possible to interpret this finding in a negative light. That fiscal policy at the state level is subject to ideological considerations may indicate inefficient policy choices and sub-optimal fiscal outcomes.
These findings suggest that in Germany, ideological battles with respect to fiscal policy are fought at the state tier. The results by Furdas and Kis-Katos (2010) indicate, on the other hand, that municipalities are to a lesser extent subject to ideological considerations than state (and presumably national) governments has interesting policy implications. It appears that one additional but somewhat neglected benefit of fiscal decentralization is the de-politization of fiscal policy. One avenue for future research is therefore to explore with cross-country data whether it is indeed the case is less subject to ideological considerations and thus produces presumably more efficient outcomes. (Model III) , and 3 percentage points (Model I). Standard errors are given in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the level of a legislative period (all years in a particular legislative period belong to the same cluster) and are robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). All models include state and year fixed effects. All models are estimated with TSLS: the endogeneous variable is whether a state government is left-wing. The exogeneous instrument is whether the left-wing party seat share is over 50%. Weak identification is tested with the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic. I) . Standard errors are given in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the level of a legislative period (all years in a particular legislative period belong to the same cluster) and are robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). All models include state and year fixed effects. All models except Model (IV) are estimated with TSLS: the endogeneous variable is whether a state government is right-wing. The exogeneous instrument is whether the right-wing party seat share is over 50%. Weak identification is tested with the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic. Model IV is estimated with OLS. 
